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great merits. In a way this is a pioneering work, and thus by its very nature
bound to be occasionally lacking in sophistication.
GERHAID BEBRt
THE MORAL DECISION. RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AmERICAN
LAW. By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955.
Pp. ix, 342. $5.00.
MR. CAHN, in his most recent book, has given us a painstaking study of a
subject that holds vital interest for all thinking persons. The book may perhaps
best be described as a detailed analysis and appraisal by a very thoughtful man
of the influence of morals on American law, chiefly our decisional law. The
author says:
"Our purpose is to learn what we can about good and evil and other
moral concerns by looking critically at the way American law deals with
them."1
Although he definitely seeks the advancement of a high moral plane-the
"good-in-law," to use his expression, his treatment is based almost entirely on
the natural order. For this reason some will miss, as I do, more explicit recog-
nition of the pervading influence of the supernatural in the realm of morals.
There are three parts-The Legal and the Good, Moral Guides in the
American Law of Rights, and Moral Guides in the American Law of Proce-
dure. The arrangement is excellent, with well chosen subdivisions, pointing
up appropriately the diverse problems with which the author deals in his in-
tense studies of his subject. There is also a short bibliography, and the book
is well housed.
The characteristics of self and the role of the conscience are among the many
factors discussed in the analysis presented of the moral "constitution" that
underlies much of our behavior. And because the author is aware of "the
beauty of those general standards that stem directly" from this constitution,2
the codified standards of moral legislation take on a broader and deeper sense
than mere enactments by legislative bodies. For example, "we see [moral
legislation] . . . in objective behavior because a subjective individual has en-
acted it in his conscience." 3 Again, after a wealth of illustrations reviewing
those factors which have played a part in the growth of moral legislation, the
author concludes that such legislation "will always reflect the mutations of
times and places-but it does so in the mirror of an expanding moral con-
stitution...."4







After reviewing the tensions in our own legal history, with excursions into
experiences of earlier periods, Mr. Cahn states a belief that there has been a
considerable rise
"in the moral level of legal standards. The more duties the law took on
its shoulders during the new industrial era, the more responsive it became
to a number of human needs it had previously neglected or ignored....
[J]udges do not say as readily as they did a century ago, 'Plaintiff may
have a moral right but he has no legal right,' . ..."5
Mr. Cahn probes for some similar process that may be identified in moral
standards. In doing so, he explains three moral standards used by us in pass-
ing judgment: the "minimum" standard, the "required" standard and the
"revered" standard. The last, he says, is of little practical reference: the actual
presence of the moral hero instills "feelings of guilt and resentment" in others. 6
The author's pen here draws perhaps too broad a line. For is it not true that
many do not succumb to resentment when confronted with the ideal, but strive
to approach it?
In an interesting comparison of the two domains-law and morals-Mr.
Cahn discusses the place in law of the subjective, as distinct from external
conduct, and of the moral importance of the state of mind.7 He states that the
clergy for many centuries so heavily over-emphasized the latter "that nothing
else seemed really meaningful." This I would think rather doubtful. The great
sweep of religious teaching has not neglected the moral importance of deeds
while emphasizing at the same time the "faith, belief, [and] the subjective
dedication to a creed" mentioned by the author. While it is true that often
what one does is forbidden by law when what one intends is not, it should be
recognized that what one thinks may be morally wrong when what one does
is not. As Mr. Cahn says, some moral precepts are enforced under law while
others are not. But then the law is not a complete moral code.
There is a discussion of a further distinction drawn by the sophisticated be-
tween moral values within and those outside the law-the difference in method
by which values are enforced. It is said to be the authentic American view,
guaranteed by our Constitution, that the development and enforcement of
morals do not belong by superior right within the jurisdiction of any church.
I think this needs some explanation, followed as it is by the statement that:
"If moral rules and behavior were considered mere subdivisions or corol-
laries of ecclesiastical tenets, no government could legislate concerning
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Perhaps the emphasis here is upon the word "mere"; for surely the develop-
ment of morals is within the jurisdiction of churches without any offense to
our Constitution, and their "enforcement," too, by precept, teaching and sua-
sion. We accord churches a very special or superior right in this regard. I
suppose Mr. Cahn does not mean otherwise.
Part I ends with an interesting review of the manner in which the "social
institution" of the law impresses itself on the moral precepts it enforces through
"the Mode of Trial," "Professional Discipline," "the Social Function" and
"Control over Official Force."
In Part II the author takes up an absorbing selection of factual situations
which have arisen in the law. The cases are concrete, they have decided moral
overtones, and the dilemmas confronting the persons involved are very real.
These problems, chosen for analysis of the relation of morals to law, include:
the taking of lives in an overcrowded longboat at sea in order to save other
lives; the duty the law imposes with respect to children exposed to attractive
hazards, such as railroad turntables; the sad manifestations of maladjustment
in domestic relations; the contact of the law with sexual problems; morality
and the law in the conduct of private business and in the business of govern-
ment; and the effort of the law to cope with the doctrine of the Good Samari-
tan-the moving moral of charity to neighbor. "[N]o institution can make us
whole if we lose an opportunity to rescue, in him, the entire human race.""
A number of questions that affect the fundamental rights of citizens, includ-
ing freedom of speech and of religion, are within the wide range of Mr. Cahn's
analyses. The problems range from birth to death, though, as he says, not all
the areas in between can be covered. And while one must reserve a different
view now and then from that taken by the author, his over-all purpose-to
advance the "good-in-law"-is commendable. In this regard he assures us, in
words borrowed from Francis Bacon, that "there is hope enough and to
spare.'1 2
Part III moves into a smooth stream of style and treatment as Mr. Cahn
here reaches "Moral Guides in the American Law of Procedure." It lacks the
intricacies that mark, for me, some earlier portions of the book. This conclud-
ing part contains a study of due process in the morality of law and its adminis-
tration in America-the means by which a claim of right can be enforced, the
place of counsel in fair trial, in sum the whole idea of due process in the law's
effort to reach moral judgment. "To presume to judge without due process is
to sink to the level of the beasts .... -113 Pitfalls of factual error and of decision
can not obviate the need for choosing alternatives; a decision must be made.
Every judgment, however, should be viewed as a self-judgment, for thus it is
more likely to be just. While recognizing that the same man may be good,





cleanse itself thoroughly before it presumes to pass judgment on anyone else."' 4
The fine flavor of this part of the volume can be conveyed only by personal
perusal.
In reviewing the essentials of due process in moral decision, the author dis-
cusses the difficulties of achieving it. The place of the forum, the necessity of
freedom in the decisional process and the part played by compromise are con-
sidered. As to the latter, the importance of timing as well as skill is stressed,
for radical adjustments require the use of time-witness the school segrega-
tion decision.
Mr. Calm convincingly outlines the qualities a judge should possess. He
should inspire confidence and wisdom in the process of fact finding to reach the
truth. Worthy of special note are these sentences:
"It is the mark of a superior mind to segregate and condemn an unfair
mode of accusation even when it is levelled at a notoriously obnoxious
individual. But this calls for a constant will to cleanse one's intellectual
apparatus by means of self-criticism."' 5
There is an exposition of the reasons which lie behind the law's insistence
that no one shall be condemned as a criminal unless proof carries conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. The philosophical character of these last pages is
evidenced by his reference to "the mutual confidences that bind a human com-
munity together.... Without conclusive proof, a judgment of condemnation
would shirk the group's obligation and reduce the group's solidarity."'16
Tribute is paid to Judge Jerome Frank, to whom the book is inscribed, and
to Judge Learned Hand. In naturalization cases, where good moral character
must be found in the applicant for a statutory period, Judge Hand's search for
"the common conscience" with respect to this standard is questioned. Mr.
Cahn prefers a more personal responsibility on the part of the judge in decid-
ing the issue.
In his concluding pages the author speaks again in praise of mankind, though
"we are utterly dispensable to a galactic scheme.' 1 7 The future will be a
struggle for existence, it will require even more of imagination, discipline and
cultural refinement than man has previously been called upon to exhibit. But
the capacity to reach moral standards superior to those of the past will persist.
Moral evolution will continue; the moral constitution abides to guide progress;
and the test of progress must be qualitative, not quantitative. Let our suc-
cessors accept the "yoke of due process and personal responsibility" :18 the task
of our society summons every human being "to join in creating the happier
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last. They slow the pen which would raise a question about the book as a
whole. Yet, scholarly and thoughtful as it is, the omission of significant and
explicit awareness of religion and Revelation should not be passed without
notice. In a work devoted to morals in relations to the law, I miss a clear
recognition of the foundation of morals, the Source of all good. I miss more
definite appreciation of the influence of religion, and of the fact that man is
endowed by his Creator.
CHARLES FAHYt
tCircuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
ERRATUM
65 Yale L.J. 54 n.108:
Omit sentence beginning "And Maico . . ." and remainder of footnote.
1236 [Vol. 65
